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Abstract
As patents grant monopolies, the patent system has a considerable impact on markets. When corporations use certain patent
strategies, social welfare can be damaged. This article focuses on how corporations use patent strategies in the biomedical
sector. Strategic patenting makes it possible to extend monopolies beyond the designated period and block competitors.
Access to fundamental research can be restricted. Patients are disadvantaged by high monopoly prices for drugs, which can
mean exclusion from treatment. It is argued here that as biomedical technologies are so vital to the welfare of people, and
that in some cases are literally a matter of life or death for patients, this area of technology should not be controlled by pri-
vate companies through their patent monopolies. The whole biomedical sector should be taken out of the ambit of the
patent system.
Policy Implications
• Governments need to recognise that certain types of invention, which are vital to social welfare, should be exempt from
patenting, as patents award a monopoly.
• There is now clear evidence that pharmaceutical companies manipulate the patent system in order to use the monopoly
to dominate markets and control access to research. Biomedical innovations should not be patented.
• A partial dismantling of the patent system is necessary to remove biomedical inventions.
• Practical steps: Patents on biomedical technology need to be phased out and no new patents granted.
• Practical steps: a robust and stable system of remuneration by public funding must be implemented.
Patent system manipulation
The patent system has become the context in which many
innovations reach society. Patented inventions are every-
where: from everyday kitchen items like coffee machines
and cleaning products to inventions that have a signiﬁcant
global impact, such as advances in medicinal drugs, systems
to purify water and increasing the harvest from crops. In
return for disclosing the information necessary for others
‘skilled in the art’ to make the invention, inventors of new
and useful products and processes are rewarded with a
monopoly, usually for 20 years. The patent is the legal
instrument that protects that monopoly.
The ideology behind the development of the patent sys-
tem was to create a win-win situation: increased prosperity
for inventors as they could make use of their market mono-
poly position to establish their reputation, recover research
costs and make a proﬁt, and increased prosperity and wel-
fare for society which could beneﬁt from these new inven-
tions. But does the patent system deliver a win-win result?
The patent application must describe how to make the
invention and this information is published during the
patent application process. Typically applicants will keep this
information to the absolute minimum necessary in order to
obtain the patent. Patenting only selected aspects of an
invention can obscure the overall conﬁguration of the
invention. The use by corporations of patents as strategic
tools has further undermined the original goals of the
patent system and skewered the patent bargain in favour of
the inventor. Biomedical innovations are vital to healthcare:
they should not be controlled by private companies through
patent monopolies.
1. The patent monopoly
The monopoly awarded to the patentee gives the patent
holder the right to exclude all others from making, using,
selling, offering to sell, keeping the product or importing
anything covered by the patent claims in all countries where
patent protection has been granted. In general, this exclu-
sionary right persists (if renewal fees are paid) until the expi-
ration of the patent protection period. This yields the patent
owner signiﬁcant power.
Even Adam Smith, who considered most exclusive privi-
leges to be detrimental to society, did not consider this to
be the case with respect to patent monopolies. These, Smith
considered, ‘are harmless enough’:
For if the legislature should appoint pecuniary
rewards for the inventors of new machines, etc.,
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they would hardly ever be so precisely propor-
tioned to the merit of the invention as this is. For
here, if the invention be good and such as is prof-
itable to mankind, he will probably make a fortune
by it; but if it be of no value he also will reap no
beneﬁt. (Smith, 1762-3, p. 83)
This too was Jeremy Bentham’s justiﬁcation of the patent
system: the utilitarian ground of efﬁciency. An exclusive priv-
ilege, Bentham argued, is ‘of all rewards the best propor-
tioned’ (Bentham, 1843, p. 71). If the invention were not
useful there would be no reward; if it was useful then the
reward would be proportionate to its utility.
2. The distortion of the patent system: the patent
as a strategic tool
As the economy has largely shifted from industrial manufac-
turing to high-tech, life science and information processing
industries, intellectual property has become more and more
important. Corporations have become increasingly aware of
the potential of the patent, not just as a shield to protect
against imitation, but as a strategic tool to block competi-
tion and dominate markets. Patents have come to have a
broader strategic function in which innovation may only
play a small part. Although many patents do not produce
any income: ‘In terms of strategy, though, the patent can be
much more valuable’ (Macdonald, 2004, p. 143).
Patent strategy is directly related to the business context.
The Carnegie Mellon Survey of the US manufacturing sector
in 1994 revealed that ﬁrms often used patents as strategic
tools, rather than as simply a means of protecting an inven-
tion from wrongful imitation (Cohen et al., 2000). In their
examination of motives to patent, Blind et al. (2009) recog-
nised that, although protection from imitation was still the
most important factor, ‘the importance of the strategic
motives to patent are conﬁrmed’ (Blind et al., 2006, p. 671).
Patent strategies
The decision to patent has become in part uncoupled from
the original core purpose of the patent: to protect an inven-
tion from unfair imitation by other market participants. Lar-
ger ﬁrms, with the capital assets to pay for the cost of
patenting, use their patent portfolios strategically.
Patents have become useful as bargaining chips; they
provide leverage. Large patent portfolios are a means to get
access to important co-operations or cross-licensing arrange-
ments (Blind et al., 2009, p. 431). Yet while building the
portfolio requires enormous legal costs, it contributes little
to research incentives. Furthermore, these portfolios can be
used not just to oblige competitors to take licences, but also
the terms of these licences can restrict competitors to cer-
tain areas of technology (Barton, 2000).
Larger ﬁrms can afford to play the ‘wrap around’ strategy.
Instead of applying for a single patent to cover an inven-
tion, other patents are ﬁled around the main patent. These
related patents lock down the discrete features of an
invention. The tactic hinders entry to the market. Competi-
tors will be put to time, effort and cost to ﬁght their way
through all the relevant patents covering the technology.
Furthermore, the chance that the competitor’s invention
may infringe one of the many claims in one of the many
patents is high. Not only can damages be awarded for
infringement, but also an injunction. Injunctions prevent the
party accused of infringement from producing any products
that require the use of the technology covered by the
infringed patent and all infringing products are removed
from the market.
Patents may be used simply to block competitors. Using a
patent as a blocking strategy is common practice (Neuh€aus-
ler, 2012). Defensive blocking is used to protect a ﬁrm’s own
freedom to operate: it does not want to be shut out by the
patents of its rivals. An offensive blocking strategy is where
patents are ﬁled to cover products or processes that the
ﬁrm does not intend to practice itself, but which could be
viable alternatives to competitors. By patenting all conceiv-
able alternatives, research by competitors that might threa-
ten their own technological lead can be thwarted. As in
general a patentee is under no obligation to license out its
technology to another, the strategy can deter market entry
or new product launch.
This offensive blocking of competitors by means of
patents, ‘is clearly a case of the patent system being used
for purposes other than for which it was originally intended’
(Blind, 2009, p. 436). However, both defensive and offensive
blocking should be a policy concern, as they can reduce
economic efﬁciency. Defensive patenting increases cost to
ﬁrms without necessarily producing any beneﬁt and offen-
sive patenting can reduce technological progress and
increase consumer costs by reducing competition (Thumm,
2004, p. 533).
Using data from a large-scale survey of patent applica-
tions, Torrisi discovered that a substantial share of patents
remained unused and a substantial number of patent appli-
cations were ﬁled to block other patents. There were institu-
tional differences; there were more unused patents in Japan
and the EU than in the USA. Although cautious to make
generalisations about unused patents, as some unused
patents are there to ensure freedom to operate or simply
because of management inefﬁciency, Torrisi et al. did con-
clude that: ‘[o]ur results highlight that there might be sub-
stantial beneﬁts that patent owners draw from being able
to keep patent rights unused. These would have to be bal-
anced against possible harm imposed on other economic
agents’ (Torrisi et al., 2016; , p. 1384).
These strategies show a disconnect with the original pur-
pose of the patent system. Patent strategies impact on inno-
vation, and this in turn impacts on society. Concern was
already expressed quite forcibly some years ago by Turner:
Surely when the framers of the [US] Constitution
empowered Congress to grant monopolies to ‘pro-
mote the progress of science and the useful arts’,
they did not envision the beneﬁciaries of this grant
would use it to bury new technologies to protect
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market share or capital investments. (Turner, 1998,
p.209)
Administrative failures
Patent ofﬁces have been struggling to cope with the
increasing number of patent applications: in 2017, more
than 3 million patent applications were ﬁled worldwide
(WIPO, 2018). This inﬂux has resulted in substantial applica-
tion backlogs, with an increasingly long time between the
patent ﬁling and the patent grant: ﬁve years is not unusual.
Complaints of poor quality control have been made con-
cerning the US Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce as well as the
European Patent Ofﬁce (Abbott, 2004; Mabey, 2010). The
WIPO recognised a consistent upward trend in patent ﬁlings
is putting patent ofﬁces under enormous pressure (WIPO,
2017, p. 13).
Why are these administrative failings dangerous from a
societal perspective? Patents grant a monopoly that can
impact innovative processes for 20 years or more. Patents
have been granted that should not have been granted.
When an overly broad patent is granted, this can block fur-
ther innovation by others. Broad patents may mean that
access to vital research is not available because the results
of that research are covered by patent claims. In particular,
broad basic patents on fundamental research can block and
deter follow-on research. The incentive to innovate is
reduced (Barton, 2000; Henry and Stiglitz, 2010).1 Back in
1966, the societal implication of overly broad grants was
expressed clearly by the US Supreme Court when it rejected
a broad claim covering a group of chemicals: ‘Such a patent
may confer power to block off whole areas of scientiﬁc
development without compensating beneﬁts to the public.’2
3. The exclusionary effects of patent system
manipulation: the biomedical sector
Biotechnical inventions have a fundamental impact on
healthcare, with applications in medical diagnosis, research
tools and pharmaceutical drugs. Knowledge has become a
very valuable asset. Its commercialisation opens up lucrative
business opportunities. The strategic use of patents in the
biomedical sector is intended to protect those business
interests. However, those patent strategies have societal
repercussions.
Intellectual property rights and biomedical research
A common argument is that there is a distinction between
fundamental research and the application of that research;
fundamental research should remain in the public domain,
while applications can be the province of patents. That is a
misguided distinction. As Eisenberg and Nelson point out, the
conventional view that basic research is a public enterprise
while applied technology is a private enterprise conducted in
the hope of earning proﬁts, ignores the ways in which basic
science and applied technology can frequently overlap: public
and private interest may then conﬂict (Eisenberg and Nelson,
2002). Fundamental research can become proprietary.
A patent should only give protection to an invention.
According to US law, this invention must be ‘useful’ (35 US
Code, Section 101) and the European Patent Convention
1973 (EPC) requires that an invention is capable of ‘industrial
application’ (Art. 52, EPC). Patent law therefore mandates that
there must be a practical application. Consequently, a patent
does not extend to a discovery, the terrain of fundamental
research, as this is explicitly excluded from patentability.
The line between ‘discovery’ and ‘invention’ has, however,
become exceedingly thin, if non-existent, with respect to
molecular technology. The current position with regard to
genes and DNA sequences in effect marks a departure from
the traditional doctrine that excluded discoveries from
patentability. Genes are not new products; they exist in nat-
ure and therefore cannot be invented. Yet today, genes and
gene sequences are patented as inventions, being regarded
as ‘products’. Even if a use of the gene or sequence is spec-
ulative, if a use is plausible at the time the patent is ﬁled
the utility requirement is fulﬁlled.
The EPC was amended to be brought into line with the
terms of the European Directive on the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions. This Directive states:
An element isolated from the human body or
otherwise produced by means of a technical pro-
cess, including the sequence or partial sequence of
a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even
if the structure of that element is identical to that of
a natural element.3
Taking an apparently different track, in 2013 the US
Supreme Court stated that the mere act of isolating a gene
from its surrounding genetic material was not an act of
invention. The court did accept synthetic cDNA as patenta-
ble, as this was created in the laboratory.4 Scientists have
voiced concern that what is often patented has not so much
been produced but rather discovered, and is human genetic
information rather than an invention (see for a summary of
some of these arguments Bergel, 2015).
These developments in patent law have created a very real
danger: researchers could be barred from accessing funda-
mental research, which in turn could hinder new knowledge
and further innovation. Back in 1998, Heller and Eisenberg
warned policy makers to be alert: more upstream rights
could block downstream innovation. In this way, the private
ownership of biomedical research could lead to fewer useful
products for improving human health (Heller and Eisenberg,
1998). If genes and DNA sequences are patent protected,
then the patent owner has the right to exclude all others
from using that technology. This breach of the discovery/in-
vention distinction is symptomatic of the expansion of paten-
table subject matter at a global level, extending property
claims deep into biology and limiting the scope for accessi-
ble treatment and future research (David and Halbert, 2017).
The danger of private ownership of fundamental research
became apparent with the commencement of the Human
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Genome Project in the 1990s. The project turned into a
struggle between publically funded scientists and private
companies. Publically funded scientists worked hard to
ensure that all their research would remain in the public
domain and therefore published all their ﬁndings to prevent
patent applications blocking access to research. Their
attempts were not always successful. For example, one day
before Mike Stratton was due to publish his paper on cancer
genes in the journal Nature in 1995, the private company
Myriad Genetics applied for a patent on BRCA1 and BRCA2,
which were associated with breast cancer. The patents
allowed it to charge for tests at a cost of $2,500 per patient.
Licences for the use of its simpler tests for breast cancer by
other labs cost several hundred dollars per patient, a cost
that, given the nature of the American healthcare system,
meant the test was not available for all female patients in
the USA. By 2015, Myriad was worth over $3bn (Pollock,
2018, p. 64).
The leading patent ofﬁces, those in the USA, Europe and
Japan, have granted thousands of patents claiming human
DNA. Patent thickets have already emerged, with many of
the sequences claimed in patents overlapping. For example,
a gene with 15 exons could have a separate patent on each
exon; there could be a claim on the complete sequence, as
well as a claim on the promoter sequence. One illustration
of the complexity of these overlapping patents is the difﬁ-
culties encountered by researchers from the PATH founda-
tion when they were trying to develop a malaria vaccine:
they had to negotiate research use for the 39 different
patents involved (Thomas et al., 2002). Thomas also points
to the dangers of broad patents grants: ‘Furthermore,
because the majority of patents covering DNA sequences
are what are termed per se claims, the applicant, in making
the ﬁrst claim, gains the right to all uses, including those
that are as yet undiscovered’ and ‘[a]n excessively broad
patent that contains claims to all conceivable diagnostic
tests creates a monopoly, such that there is little incentive
to develop improved tests’ (Thomas et al., 2002, pp. 1186–
1187).
Some commentators are not convinced that patent
monopolies have hindered follow-up research. Clark states
that there is a lack of evidence that intellectual property
protection measures have had a signiﬁcant negative impact
on academic biomedical research: ‘In the face of no empiri-
cal evidence, the myth that patents inhibit biomedical
research, publication and dissemination of knowledge is
promulgated’ (Clark, 2011, pp. 79–80). Caulﬁeld et al. (2006),
while acknowledging that there have been good reasons for
concern, like Clark concludes ‘the feared problems have not
widely manifested’. However, Caulﬁeld et al.’s research does
point to one important exception: gene patents that cover a
diagnostic test. Patent owners have asserted exclusivity or
licence terms ‘widely viewed as inappropriate’ (Caulﬁeld
et al., 2006;, pp. 1892–1893).
The assertion of ‘no empirical evidence’ is certainly too
strong. Examples of problematic access to fundamental
technology do bubble to the surface. One such example is
the position regarding zinc-ﬁnger proteins (ZFPs), which can
bind almost all DNA sequences. The ZFP patent portfolio
has been dominated by one ﬁrm in particular: Sangamo.
Researchers found that Sangamo was highly selective in its
choice of collaborators. Academic scientists therefore often
took the risk of using the technology without a licence, hop-
ing that Sangamo would not sue academics. However, even
this did not solve the problem. The patents did not disclose
all the necessary information. Vital knowledge remained in
the Sangamo database and design rule set. Without this
proprietary information scientists could not practice the
claimed invention: ‘More complete patent disclosure might
also have obviated the need to generate various open
science alternatives to the Sangamo platform’ (Chan-
drasekharan et al., 2009).
These examples should not be dismissed as ‘anecdotes’;
they are important. They indicate that access by academics
to fundamental research can be hampered. Nor do we know
how many innovative start-ups or small ﬁrms have been
hindered by blocking patents, too expensive licences,
restrictive licence terms or threats of being sued for patent
infringement. An assessment of the situation cannot be
made simply by looking at litigated cases: litigated cases are
always the tip of the iceberg.
The pharmaceutical industry
Pharma companies stress that medicinal drugs take years of
research and development. The venture is also far from risk
free: the drug may be a failure either because clinical trials
fail, so approval is not given, or because it is not a commer-
cial success. Based on a study at the Tufts Center, it has
been estimated that the time needed for the development
of a new drug, from initial stages through to approval, takes
on average 11.8 years and will cost in the range of $802
million to $1.8 billion (DiMasi et al., 2003; Barazza, 2014). It
is these costs, the industry argues, that justify the high price
of the drugs. In a critique of the methodology used by the
Tufts Center to explain a cost of $802 million, and the lack
of public access to the data used for the study, Light and
Warburton argue that such estimates should be treated with
scepticism; these are ‘mythical costs’ to try to justify the
high prices of drugs (Light and Warburton, 2011).
What is clear is that if the drug survives the patent pro-
cess and the authorisation process, and turns out to be a
blockbuster, huge proﬁts can be reaped. For example, the
Danish company Lundbeck grew rapidly in the 1990s pri-
marily because of its anti-depression drug, Citalopram.
Citalopram alone accounted for around 80 per cent of the
company’s sales by the end of the twentieth century, with
large sales ﬁgures for Europe and the USA at that time
bringing in kr. 720 million.5 Similarly, Losec, a medicine for
stomach ulcers, was so successful that it is estimated to
have brought in between $15–30 billion for AstraZeneca,
making AstraZeneca one of the largest global pharmaceuti-
cal companies (Granstrand and Tietze, 2014).
Many pharmaceutical companies have not been reticent
to exert their monopoly position to ensure market domi-
nance and satisfy their investors. However, with some
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exceptions, a patent expires after 20 years. When the patent
expires, the market for the drug opens up to generic drug
companies. These generic drug manufacturers have not had
to sustain the costs in development of the original brand
manufacturers. This means that they can sell generic medici-
nes considerably cheaper: on average 25% lower than the
price of the brand drugs at the time of generic entry and
40% lower two years after entry. The share of the market by
generic companies after two years is estimated at 45%
(European Commission, 2009: paragraph 1560). It is not sur-
prising, given the huge proﬁts that a blockbuster drug can
make for a company, that pharma companies will look to
manipulate the patent system to prolong their market domi-
nance.
The brand name drug companies have various strategies
they can employ. They can wrap many patents around the
original patent, resulting in patent clusters. Patents are ﬁled
for certain speciﬁc aspects of a single product, such as dos-
ing, delivery systems and combinations. For example,
depending on the medicine, the medicine may come with a
proprietary inhaler or injector that is integrated into the
product. Yet these combinations will be patented separately.
Consequently, even after all the patents on the medicine
expire, the remaining patents on the associated device, or
parts of the device, can be sufﬁcient to prevent generic
entry (Beall et al., 2016).
The ‘evergreening’ strategy is a form of blocking mainly
used in the pharmaceutical industry. As the patent system
allows improvements and additions to be patented, inven-
tions that are really just slight modiﬁcations of the old drug
are patented. These secondary patents, usually ﬁled just
before the patent on the original drug expires and competi-
tion can start, each gain 20 years protection. The weaker
patents are an attempt to prolong the patent protection of
the original, much stronger patent. Although from the tech-
nical perspective only minor improvements may be
involved, from an economic perspective these can be signiﬁ-
cant as patents for incremental improvement processes can
be ﬁled almost continually. Building and maintaining a
patent network of new medical applications, improvements
and substitutions is an effective evergreening strategy, also
cutting down possibilities for ‘invent around’ attempts
(Granstrand and Tietze, 2014). As Dwivedi et al. (2010, p.
324) notes: ‘While most of these evergreening strategies
conform to the letter of the law, very often they seem to
undermine the spirit in which patent laws were created’.
Even when generic products do enter the market, patients
will not always opt for the cheaper drug. Why? What should
not be underestimated is the scope and intensity of the
marketing campaigns of the brand name companies. Their
aim is to ensure that patients switch to the second genera-
tion product by convincing them that the newer version is
worth the extra money. Strategies include convincing mar-
keting authorisation and pricing and reimbursement bodies,
as well as doctors, that the generic product is less safe, less
effective or of inferior quality (European Commission, 2009).
Another major strategy used by brand name companies is
the so-called ‘pay-for-delay’ practice. This practice was one
of the concerns that prompted the European Commission to
launch its enquiry into the pharmaceutical industry in 2008.
In a ‘pay-for-delay’ agreement, a generic manufacturer
agrees to delay entry to the market in exchange for a value
transfer. Instead of the claimant brand name company
demanding damages from the generic company for
infringement of its existing secondary patents, in reverse
payment settlements the one accused of infringement is the
one receiving payment. The generic company is basically
paid simply to keep out of the patent owner’s market,
often also agreeing not to challenge the validity of the
claimant’s (secondary) patents. The parties can reach a set-
tlement by in effect sharing part of the monopoly proﬁt,
the consequence being that prices are kept high (Choi
et al., 2014).
Following the sector enquiry, the European Commission
issued a number of decisions against brand name compa-
nies and those generic companies that had entered into
agreements with them. In 2013, Lundbeck and four generic
ﬁrms were ﬁned €145 million, a decision conﬁrmed by the
General Court of the European Union in 2016: the agree-
ment was per se illegal being a violation of EU competition
law. Other pharma companies ﬁned included Johnson &
Johnson, Novartis and Servier. The Final Report by the Euro-
pean Commission observed: ‘The additional costs caused by
delays to generic entry can be very signiﬁcant for the public
health budgets and ultimately the consumer.’ (European
Commission, 2009, p. 1558).
These ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements have also been chal-
lenged in the USA. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was
of the opinion that these agreements were infringements of
competition law and that ‘[a]lthough both the brand name
companies and generic ﬁrms are better off with such settle-
ments, consumers lose the possibility of earlier generic
entry’.6 In the lawsuit the FTC brought against Actavis for
agreeing to delay bringing its version of Solvay’s AndroGel
to market, the US Supreme Court did not categorise the
agreement as per se illegal. It mandated that a ‘rule of rea-
son’ approach should be used, reviewing such settlements
on a case by case basis.7 The FTC has remained committed
to scrutinising pay-for-delay agreements.
The monopoly position has made it possible for pharma
companies to charge high prices for their medicines. At
times this has caused public outrage, particularly when the
price of a drug rose considerably from one day to another.
For example, the price of tablets containing the drug Dara-
prim, when acquired by Turing Pharmaceuticals, rose from
$13.50 a tablet to $750 a tablet overnight, bringing the cost
of treatment per annum for some patients to thousands of
dollars. Cycloserine increased in price from $500 for 30 pills
to $10,800 for 30 pills after it was acquired by Rodelis Thera-
peutics (Pollack, 2015).
The high price of some medications has caused concern
in Europe too. Governments struggle in their negotiations
with pharma companies. In the Netherlands, the govern-
ment has expressed its dissatisfaction with the current situa-
tion in a report. One of the problems highlighted in this
report is the patent monopoly:
Global Policy (2019) © 2019 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Patents from a Biomedical Perspective 5
Another important cause of high prices is the
extensive protection manufacturers obtain on their
patents. This process was originally intended to
stimulate innovation, but is currently used by the
industry to maintain a monopoly – and thereby a
high price - on new medications for as long as pos-
sible.
This has a signiﬁcant impact on society:
The way the pharmaceutical market works has led
to innovation and new medicines which are extre-
mely valuable for patients. But those patients, and
in fact all Dutch people who pay insurance premi-
ums, ﬁnd themselves at a disadvantage because
pharmaceutical companies have a monopoly when
it comes to new medicines. Therefore, we need to
seek a healthy balance between rewarding innova-
tion and the affordability of medicinal care. (Min-
istry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport, the
Netherlands, 2016: pp. 4, 13)
The price of medicines has become a matter of critical
importance even for wealthier countries.
The pharmaceutical industry and developing countries
However, perhaps the largest group of patients excluded
from the potential beneﬁts of biomedical research are those
in developing countries. Exclusion can originate in the very
choice of which drugs pharma companies decide to
develop. Their research tends to be market orientated. By
the end of the twentieth century, only about one per cent
of newly developed drugs were for tropical diseases, such
as African sleeping sickness, dengue fever and leishmaniosis
(Maurer et al., 2004). Companies aim to make a proﬁt and
satisfy shareholders. It is therefore not surprising that expen-
sive R&D will be more geared up to the types of illnesses
prevalent in developed countries, as these countries have
more capital resources to pay the price for these drugs. As
Stiglitz (2006: p. 1279) observed: ‘Poor people cannot afford
drugs, and drug companies make investments that yield the
highest returns’.
Not only does the choice of which drug is developed sig-
niﬁcantly impact on developing countries: the imposition of
stringent requirements for intellectual property protection
under the TRIPS agreement is also a factor in access to
treatment. This was made explicit in the World Bank report:
Nothing is more controversial in TRIPS. It is conceiv-
able that patent protection will increase incentives
for R&D into treatments for diseases of particular
concern to poor countries. However because pur-
chasing power is so limited in the poorest coun-
tries, there is little reason to expect a signiﬁcant
boost in such R&D. Accordingly, many developing
countries see little potential beneﬁt from introduc-
ing patents. In contrast, potential costs could be
signiﬁcant. (World Bank, 2001, p. 137)
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement in 2001
did conﬁrm the right of countries to use compulsory
licences to gain access to medicines. By issuing a compul-
sory licence, the government gives permission to a third
party to produce the patented product or process without
the consent of the patent owner. The drug so produced is
much cheaper than the brand name drug at the monopoly
price. This right has already been exercised on various occa-
sions, for example by the South African authorities in 2003
in order to create more general access to AIDS medicines.
Does compulsory licensing therefore deal with any nega-
tive impact of TRIPS for developing countries, given that
TRIPS hindered the use of cheaper, domestic generic ver-
sions of brand name patented drugs? Compulsory licensing
is not without undesirable side effects. It has the potential
to reduce incentives for pharma companies to innovate, and
for tensions between the government authorising the com-
pulsory licences and the governments of the patentees,
which can have both political and economic implications
(Flynn et al., 2009; Reichman, 2009). There have been indica-
tions that the USA is not entirely at ease when states order
compulsory licensing of American pharmaceuticals (Nagan
et al., 2017). Compulsory licensing may be an instrument to
alleviate the strictures of the patent system to some extent,
but it is not the entire solution.
4. Alternatives to the current patent system
Should the biomedical sector be excluded from the patent
system? The patent system ‘one size ﬁts all’ construction is a
legacy from an industrial age. Trying to ﬁt the inventions of
the information age, with its software technology and life
sciences, into a system of the industrial age is, at the least,
problematic. Some consider that it must fail (Bessen and
Meurer, 2008). Thurow too advocates that the patent system
should not be the same for all types of innovation, but
instead be adapted to ﬁt the needs of different industries,
types of knowledge and inventors. Nonetheless, he still
believes stronger monopoly rights is the way forward: ‘In
our modern economies, private monopoly power should be
less worrisome than it was when our patent system was
originally set up’ (Thurow, 1997: p. 101). Certainly with
respect to the biomedical sector, this sweeping assertion is
rather hard to understand.
The patent reform approach
There have been calls for the reform of the patent system.
Reform is needed to redress administrative shortcomings,
requiring more thorough and stringent patent examination
and ensuring bad or overly broad patents are not awarded.
Suggestions have also been made for a review of the patent
duration period, which in many jurisdictions is standardly 20
years. Posner argues that intellectual property presents a
more serious problem of rent seeking (an excess of revenue
over cost) than physical property does. Limiting the duration
of the property right would be one way of cutting down its
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value to the owner and thereby reducing the amount of
rent seeking (Posner, 2002).
The abolition of intellectual property rights
There are those who dismiss the whole concept of intellec-
tual property as antiquated, economically inefﬁcient and
detrimental to consumers. David (2017) contends that in an
era of digital networks, characterised by rapid and global
knowledge dissemination, the public good is best served by
a sharing-based economy, rather than a system of intellec-
tual property protection designed to limit market entry.
Boldrin and Levine argue that patents need to be abol-
ished entirely in favour of other legal instruments that are
less open to lobbying and rent seeking. Looking at the phar-
maceutical sector, they concluded that the current system is
not working well: ‘[t]here are a number of ways to reduce
the risks and cost of developing new drugs, rather than just
trying to ratchet up patent protection’ (Boldrin and Levine,
2013, p. 19). Like Pollock (2018), they advocate an incremen-
tal dismantling of the patent system, by gradually decreas-
ing patent monopolies. The dismantling of the entire system
of intellectual property is the ultimate goal.
State funding, rewards and prizes
State funding for medical research already exists to some
extent, both directly and indirectly. Looking at the USA,
Light and Warburton (2011, p. 41) suggest that: ‘A reason-
able guess is that half of corporate R&D expenses are paid
for by taxpayers over the long term’. They also point out
that basic research, which may lay the foundations for the
later development of speciﬁc drugs, is also regularly carried
out at universities or government research labs.
Stiglitz (2006) advocated the introduction of a medical
prize fund. The fund would be structured so as to give large
rewards for cures or vaccines for diseases like malaria that
affect millions, and smaller rewards for drugs that are similar
to existing drugs but may have slightly different side effects.
These prizes could be funded by governments in advanced
countries. In the case of diseases that afﬂict developing
countries, the funding could be part of development assis-
tance. The intellectual property would be made available to
generic drug companies.
The idea of publically funded rewards, rather than a
monopoly, is not new. In Britain, Parliament granted sub-
stantial sums of money as rewards to certain individual
inventors in the period 1750–1825. For example Edward Jen-
ner received a grant from Parliament of £10,000 in 1802
and a further £20,000 ﬁve years later for his research into
the smallpox vaccine. Many organisations also had reward
schemes (MacLeod, 1988). Reward systems were seen as an
alternative method for encouraging innovation. However,
these initiatives were ad hoc, rather than a coherent, com-
prehensive system of public funding.
If the patent monopoly is to be removed, then a stable
system of public funding would have to be implemented. It
could counter the two types of losses patent monopolies
create. Consumers have to pay a higher price because the
patent owner sells the product at the monopoly price. But
there is also a ‘deadweight cost’: there are fewer transac-
tions because of the high cost. From an economic perspec-
tive a deadweight loss is inefﬁcient. Shavell and Van
Ypersele (2001) experimented by developing a model of
innovation to show the comparison between reward sys-
tems and patent systems, in which the reward system was
shown to be superior to the patent. The reward gave inven-
tors the incentive to innovate, and there was no deadweight
loss from monopoly pricing. They did acknowledge in their
analysis, however, that the government’s knowledge about
the social value of innovations was important to the perfor-
mance of the reward system. The presumption was that the
government could obtain the necessary information about
demand and gain sufﬁcient information on sales data. In a
reward system, drugs would be much cheaper and more
widely available, leading to signiﬁcant increases in consumer
welfare.
Pollock (2018) argues that in order to present a viable
alternative to the patent system, remuneration rights must
be both technically and politically feasible. He argues that
such rights are technically feasible because the infrastruc-
ture is already in place: we already determine who owns
innovations, we already share rights between multiple inno-
vators, and paying creators from a remuneration rights fund
would be fairly straightforward in accordance with the
usage and value created by the innovations (to be overseen
by independent assessors). Political feasibility would require
adequate and sustainable ﬁnancing of the funds, and a
robust governance structure and legal status for the funds.
Again, he believes these requirements can be fulﬁlled
because the intellectual property regime stands model for
the necessary mechanisms; global, international agreements.
The remuneration framework is compatible with the legal
frameworks that have been developed by TRIPS, which also
has built in ﬂexibilities. However, practicalities dictate that
there would have to be a transition period. Older patents
would expire and no new patents would be granted.
Pollock (2018) does refer to a potential impediment: it
would require the existing monopoly holders to support the
change, or at least not actively oppose it. For the pharma
companies, this would mean the USA setting up a remuner-
ation fund for medicines that would have to be as richly
endowed as the total amount of money spent on patent
medicines today, so that the companies need not lose out.
This potential impediment should not be underestimated.
Pharmaceutical lobbies are immensely inﬂuential in the USA.
Pharma companies spend by far the most on lobbying in
the USA (Center for Responsive Politics, 2018). The right to
lobby is protected by the US Constitution under the ‘right
to petition the government’ in the ﬁrst amendment. Lobby-
ists have a responsibility to inform lawmakers on the issues
of their expertise in order to help Congress make informed
decisions. They may ﬁnancially support political candidates
who back their positions, resulting in an industry amounting
to billions of dollars every year. Since the early 2000s corpo-
rate lobbying expenditures have consistently exceeded the
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combined House-Senate budget (Drutman, 2015). Pharma-
ceutical lobbying has also had an impact on federal health-
care legislation (Burcescu, 2016). Pharmaceutical lobbying
will be a hurdle to any attempt to implement a law transfer-
ring biomedical research and drug development to a remu-
neration system rather than a patent monopoly system.
5. Evaluating the patent system and alternatives
with respect to the biomedical sector
Suggestions for patent reform are aimed at modifying the
patent system, but not dismantling it. The award of a mono-
poly would still be maintained. However, is that monopoly
desirable with respect to biomedical inventions? Is the
removal of the monopoly necessary in order to prevent cor-
porations using their patents as strategic tools to dominate
the markets for pharmaceuticals and dictate their terms to
consumers and researchers alike?
Patent monopolies enable biotech companies not only to
dictate access to sectors of biomedical research but also the
price of the drugs that develop from that research. Filing
many patents around the same invention can deter market
entry by others. Patent protection can be extended well
beyond the statutory period by patenting incremental
improvements, additions and complementary items. Com-
petitors can be blocked from the market by an offensive
blocking strategy. Although competition law has the poten-
tial to deal with abuses like ‘pay-to-delay’ agreements, such
agreements could never be instigated without the patent
system allowing the brand name companies to continuously
patent minor, incremental improvements and additions.
Nor does the patent system guarantee an efﬁcient and
comprehensive dissemination of knowledge in return for the
patent monopoly. Without doubt, patent databases are a
signiﬁcant source of technical information, but what is dis-
closed in a patent speciﬁcation is the absolute minimum
necessary to obtain the patent. Creating a speciﬁcation that
is no more than adequate in order to obtain the patent is
one of the skills expected of the patent attorney. The rest of
the information remains secret. Private corporations control
the access to their know-how, patents and biomedical data-
bases.
There are inventions that are so vital to social welfare that
it is simply not appropriate to allow private companies to
regulate access to those inventions through the strategic
use of patent monopolies. The biomedical sector is one such
sector: it must be taken out of the ambit of the patent sys-
tem. The risk that there will be patients who are excluded
from all the beneﬁts innovative research can bring is too
great. Biomedical patents need to be phased out and
replaced with robust public funding schemes.
Conclusions
A distinction needs to be drawn between different sorts of
inventions. With reform, the patent system may be a ‘harm-
less enough’ practice for certain types of non-essential prod-
ucts and processes. However, pharmaceutical drugs are a
very different category of goods. Monopoly prices in this
sector do not determine what kind of mundane, everyday
items we might wish to purchase. They determine access to
treatment for illnesses and in some cases lifesaving drugs. It
is evident from the way that ﬁrms use patenting as a strate-
gic tool that access to drugs should not be a matter left to
the market; access to research that can affect humankind
should not be up to whether a private company is prepared
to license its technology.
The present patent system is deeply ﬂawed. It can be
manipulated by those who know how to play the patent
game. Men like Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham consid-
ered a patent system to be harmless because if consumers
did not like a new product, they could simply opt not to
buy it. In the case of pharmaceuticals that element of choice
does not always pertain; that product may be absolutely
necessary and there may be no substitute. Even if there is a
generic version, a patient may have been informed that the
substitute is inferior.
The patent system is not perfect. The alternatives sug-
gested to the patent system would not be perfect either. In
a remuneration system there would be disputes about what
the correct value of the innovations should be. An indepen-
dent monitoring system, accepted internationally, would be
essential. Neither should it be presumed that replacing the
patent system with open access would mean that propri-
etary information would be shared by corporations. Estab-
lishing a stable, trusted and practical alternative to the
patent system for biomedical technology will not be easy,
but it is necessary. The role of governments will be of fun-
damental importance if biomedical patenting is to be
replaced by a coherent system of public funding.
Governments need to recognise that not all sectors of
technology should be subject to patent monopolies. Certain
technologies must be exempt because they are too impor-
tant to the wellbeing of the planet and its inhabitants to be
left to the control of private companies. Social welfare dic-
tates that the entire biomedical sector should be taken out
of the ambit of the patent system: access to medicines,
diagnostic tests and research tools must remain open access
and the price of drugs should not exclude the poor from
treatment.
Even such a partial abolition of the patent system would
be a radical move. Will governments be prepared to initiate
such a radical change? It would be a mammoth task, it will
be ﬁercely opposed by pharma companies, but it has to be
the way forward.
Notes
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